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Recent developments in surveillance: An overview of body-worn cameras 
in schools 
 




Introduction: Background to school surveillance  
 
The field of surveillance studies has grown exponentially as awareness of mass surveillance, 
prejudicial profiling, human rights abuses, data mining, and anti-democratic intrusions have 
materialised. Edward Snowden’s revelations about the National Security Agency (NSA), 
persistent phone hacking scandals, violated credit card details, and the leaking of data from 
dating websites, have all contributed to revealing the huge amounts of sensitive information 
being compiled  by large organisations, both public and private, the fragility of their claims to 
protect it, and the devastating consequences of breaches. Each, in turn, momentarily permits a 
glimpse through the veil of mundanity that drapes over surveillance practices, inviting us to 
question the immateriality of the vast networks of data flows we are increasingly enmeshed 
in. “If you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear” has become a tedious leitmotif in 
response to influxes of new surveillance technologies but the catalogue of cracks in the 
veneer of vapidity suggests otherwise. This chapter focuses on a population that arguably 
most would accept have nothing to hide – schoolchildren - in order to challenge the pervasive 
rhetoric that the sea of surveillance devices they are awash in are inconsequential and benign.  
 
The scope and sophistication of new technologies and their impact on behaviour have 
generated an increased awareness of, and, somewhat paradoxically, scrutiny of surveillance 
practices. Much has now been written by scholars grappling with the rapidity of 
developments in the education sphere. Several books explore the amalgam of technologies 
now routinely used in schools (e.g. Monahan and Torres, 2010; Taylor and Rooney, 2017; 
Taylor, 2013). They look at the drivers, materiality, impacts and experiences of school-based 
surveillance. Other analyses examine the factors underpinning the emergence of school 
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surveillance locating it in broader socio-political contexts. For example, some perceive 
militarization and corporatisation of state schools to be key factors (e.g. Casella, 2006; 
Saltman and Gabbard, 2003), although recognising these processes are themselves embedded 
in broader sociocultural shifts, such as the neoliberalising of education policy (e.g. Hope, 
2015; Lewis, 2003; Taylor, 2013).  
 
Other analyses are more concerned with particular examples of surveillance technologies, 
and while more often than not they are located in an appreciation of a wider nexus of school 
based surveillance assemblages, they seek to expound upon a specific technology or practice 
and the concerns that they have ostensibly been introduced to assist with. Just some of these 
include exploration and analysis of surveillance cameras (e.g. McCahill and Finn, 2010; 
Taylor, 2010a; 2011; Warnick; 2010), digital fingerprint scanning (e.g. Leaton-Gray, this 
collection; Taylor, 2010b), geolocation tagging such as radio frequency identification (RFID) 
tagging (e.g. Ema and Fujigaki, 2011; Taylor, 2017a), dataveillance and learning analytics 
(e.g. Williamson, 2017), health surveillance (e.g. Gard and Lupton, 2017; Rich, 2017; 
Williamson, 2015), randomised suspicionless drug and alcohol testing (e.g. Taylor, 2017b), 
online ‘anti-radicalisation’ software (Taylor, forthcoming) and school-based internet usage 
and e-safety (e.g. Barnard-Wills, 2012; Hope, 2015; Steeves, Regana and Shade, this 
collection). This chapter focuses on the relatively recent phenomenon of body cameras being 
worn by school personnel in the US and the UK and, drawing on the expanding literature, 
uses it to propel discussion about the broader issues that surveillance introduces in to schools.   
 
The chapter is divided into three main parts. The first section provides a brief overview of 
just some of the numerous surveillance technologies and techniques that are used in schools 
around the world. There are many, and too numerous to do justice in a single chapter. As 
indicated above, they include surveillance cameras, geotracking, random alcohol and drug 
testing, finger scans, dataveillance, and wearable technologies. In order to provide a little 
more than a cursory account of each, this chapter focuses on body-worn cameras (BWC), 
whilst recognising that they sit alongside many more apparatus and processes. Illustrations 
are international in scope, but largely drawn from the US and the UK as key consumers of 
school surveillance technologies. It should, therefore, not be presumed that all examples can 
be found in all locales; cultural specitivities and context are important when analysing the 
materiality of surveillance. Following on from this, the second half of the chapter examines 
what is thus far known about the impacts, effects and affects of school surveillance. There 
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have been surprisingly few empirical studies but those that have been conducted provide vital 
data to highlight that, far from inconsequential, the intensity of school surveillance has a huge 
impact on schoolchildren, schools and society. The contribution of the chapter is twofold. 
First, it harnesses what is currently known about surveillance practices in schools, 
highlighting a particularly new development in the form of BWC. There has been a lot 
written about school surveillance in recent years; as the techniques and technologies for 
monitoring in schools have multiplied and grown, so too has the scholarly research 
documenting and examining such developments, but school-based BWC has yet to attract 
much academic attention. Second, it serves to explicate the structural impacts of schools that 
are increasingly permeated by surveillance technologies, paying particular attention to the 
social sorting proclivity of school surveillance, and the potential for a school-to-prison-
pipeline.  
 
Developments in school surveillance 
 
Multiple technologies, attending to the visual, biometric, spatial, online and algorithmic 
capturing and processing of data, have emerged in schools internationally. For example, 
digital fingerprinting, location tracking (including radiofrequency identification (RFID) and 
GPS), suspicionless drug and alcohol testing, police sniffer dogs, a range of surveillance 
cameras (including overt, covert, wall-mounted and wearable cameras), online monitoring, 
iris scanning, airport-style security arches and hand-held metal detector wands. Due to the 
constraints of space, the following section explicates one of the more recent developments 
that has not yet received much scholarly attention - representing expansion in visual 
surveillance, school body-worn cameras.  
 
Wall-mounted and body-worn surveillance cameras 
 
Beyond early observations that schools were one of several ‘enclosed institutions of 
discipline’ (Foucault, 1977: 215) (alongside hospitals, prisons, asylums) embedding the 
potentiality for human surveillance in their structural and architectural design, the school as a 
site of technological surveillance only really began to attract attention when closed circuit 
television (CCTV) appeared in school classrooms, corridors and canteens, as well as on 
school buses. A perfect exposition of ‘surveillance creep’, early camera systems were 
defended on the basis that they were being installed to protect staff and students from 
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intruders, but were soon being deployed for school discipline and teacher performance. For 
example, a survey conducted by the Association of Teachers and Lecturers (ATL, 2010) 
found that although 98 per cent of teachers claimed CCTV was installed for security 
purposes, 50 per cent reported it being used in other ways such as to monitor pupil behaviour. 
CCTV has continued to be installed in schools around the world.1  
 
Since the emergence of CCTV seemingly eroded generalised resistance to visual monitoring 
in schools, there has been a continual deluge of new surveillance technologies flooding the 
now lucrative education market. Continuing with the focus on audiovisual surveillance 
technologies, a relatively recent development is body-worn cameras being deployed in 
schools with various school-based personnel beginning to wear them. For example, a school 
district in southeastern Iowa in the US has provided school principals at each of the district's 
eight school buildings with a body camera (Friedersdorf, 2015). Although, in the US, body-
worn cameras (BWCs) are largely being introduced to school campuses by School Resource 
Officers (SROs), school-based police officers (see chapters by Brent and Wilson; Nolan; 
Brown this collection) to capture misdemeanours and record interactions with students, staff 
and parents. For example, it has been reported that the El Paso Independent School District in 
Texas has equipped all of its SROs with body cameras (Martinez, 2016). In the UK, it is not 
school administrators or police officers, but rather teachers that are pioneering the use of 
wearable audiovisual devices. The number of schools that are using the technology is 
unknown, as the Department for Education apathetically issued a statement to say that it was 
simply ‘a matter for the schools’ (cited in Pells, 2017: n.p.) but there has been media 
coverage of at least two schools trialling their use. 
 
Given that it is a relatively recent phenomenon, there has been very little published research 
on body-worn cameras being worn by school personnel and the issues that this introduces to 
education. Furthermore, very little is known about how teachers and students feel about their 
use. A survey of 600 teachers, commissioned by the Times Education Supplement (TES) in 
the UK, found that more than a third (37.7 per cent) reported that they would be willing to 
wear a body camera in school, and two thirds (66.4 per cent) claimed that they would feel 
                                                 
1 There are some notable examples where school-based surveillance cameras have met considerable resistance, 
such as in Australia, due to a belief that the cameras are symptomatic of hypersecuritisation that is not beneficial 
in educational settings (Rooney, 2010; Taylor, 2017c). Such examples of the culturally mediated reception of 
surveillance apparatus are important to understand the heterogeneous and uneven dispersal of school 
surveillance practices globally. 
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safer if they knew that there was a camera recording (cited in Bloom, 2017). Of note, the 
survey revealed that 35.1 per cent of teachers that were willing to wear a camera so that they 
could monitor and gain evidence of student (mis)behaviour, but just 19.5 per cent said that 
they would do so in order to improve their teaching. Similar disparities have been found in 
relation to wall-mounted surveillance cameras whereby teachers welcomed them to monitor 
students, but were less favourable if they believed the focus would be turned on them. As 
argued elsewhere, ‘the legitimacy of surveillance is often premised on a shared understanding 
of who, what, where, and for what reason an individual or group is a valid target of 
surveillance’ (Taylor, 2013: 11). Thus far there have been no published studies examining 
student perceptions of BWC.  
 
Reasons for body-worn cameras in schools 
 
In the absence of academic literature and official reports on how and why BWC is being used 
in schools, media reports reveal two recurrent reasons that appear to be offered for their 
introduction (e.g. Bloom, 2017; Pells, 2017; Sabur, 2017). These can be generalised into the 
following two justifications: (1) Prevention (to deter bad behaviour amongst the student 
body), and, (2) Evidence (to capture footage should any misbehaviours, illegal or otherwise, 
occur for the purposes of disciplinary action). These are both very similar to reasons that 
were put forth when CCTV was being rolled out to schools across England and Wales 
(Taylor, 2010a). It is important to unpack these explanations in order to provide an 
alternative narrative to the presumption of appropriateness and effectiveness that often 
accompanies the introduction of surveillance technologies in schools. The following section 
briefly examines each in turn, drawing on available findings from studies on visual 
surveillance in schools and the use of BWC in other contexts, such as policing, in order to 
understand whether they really are the best solution to the issue/s.  
 
(1) Preventing bad behaviour 
 
The first, relating to prevention, calls forth long established debates relating to the deterrence 
capabilities of video recording. The premise is that a rational thinking individual will decide 
not to commit a violation if they know that they will be caught on camera, and therefore they 
perceive that there is a greater likelihood of being apprehended and someone (‘a capable 
guardian’) taking action against them. It is certainly possible that body-worn cameras could 
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discourage some behaviours, but research demonstrates that the deterrence capability of 
visual surveillance is only really pertinent for some instrumental and premeditated actions, 
such as motor vehicle theft in terms of crime (Gill et al, 2005; Welsh and Farrington, 2002). 
As Welsh & Farrington, 2009: 716) reported in their systematic review of 44 evaluations of 
CCTV:  
 
The results suggest that CCTV caused a modest (16%) but significant decrease in 
crime in experimental areas compared with control areas … largely driven by the 
effectiveness of CCTV schemes in car parks … Schemes in most other public settings 
had small and nonsignificant effects on crime’.  
 
In the context of the classroom, if a student is intending to commit a premeditated violation 
such as a theft, they are likely to seek out a place where there are no teachers, SROs, and 
certainly no cameras. Research findings from the few empirical studies of school CCTV have 
reported that the cameras simply displace school misbehaviour to locations that are not under 
surveillance, technological or humanistic, rather than deter it altogether (e.g. Taylor, 2013), 
and this notion of displacement appears to be writ large in the evaluations of public CCTV 
(Welsh and Farrington, 2008). For example, in one study of CCTV in schools it was found 
that students reported that they would smoke and play truant in locations that they knew were 
not within the field of vision of the cameras (Taylor, 2013). In this respect, visual 
surveillance doesn’t prevent misbehaviour but rather alters conduct by inviting transgressions 
that cannot be seen on a camera (‘tactical displacement’), or by displacing it elsewhere 
(‘spatial displacement’). In this respect the presence of surveillance, whether cameras, 
fingerprinting or something else, encourages heteronomous decision-making whereby 
behaviour is an outcome of perceived rewards or punishments rather than critical thinking or 
evaluation.  
 
In relation to other types of prohibited behaviour, particularly expressive behaviours, such as 
aggression and violence, there are findings from the CCTV literature that can, again, be 
drawn upon to understand the potential capabilities of BWC. Expressive crimes, and 
particularly those involving drugs or alcohol, have been found to be far less impacted by the 
presence of cameras than other types of crime because, typically, they are not calculated and 
assailants are much less likely to be in a rational mind-set and therefore not responsive to the 
cameras (see Short and Ditton, 1998; see also Allard et al, 2008). Of course school violence 
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should be taken very seriously and all efforts made to prevent it. However, the evidence from 
CCTV in schools, and the use of BWC in other contexts such as policing2, suggest that the 
cameras are not an effective solution to violence. In fact, there are reasons to believe that 
mainstreaming the occurrence of school personnel wearing cameras could actually exacerbate 
bad behaviour. For example, their introduction normalises the potentiality of student-teacher 
interactions becoming violent at any time which in itself can be counterproductive, sending a 
message to students that aggressive responses are expected from them. Furthermore, through 
a complex process of criminalisaing students and simultaneously eroding trust between 
teachers and students, school BWC is a risky development in school discipline. Of particular 
concern, is the way that surveillance technologies can usurp alternative strategies for 
addressing unruly behaviour. This could include strategies of restorative justice (see Deakin 
and Kupchik, this collection), using additional teaching assistants in particularly challenging 
classes and schools, and establishing methods to resolve conflict in a more sustainable and 
meaningful way.  
 
(2) Providing evidence 
 
The second reason that appears to be relatively common in response to the use of body-worn 
cameras in schools, is a need to capture footage of any incidents should they occur. This is 
also somewhat problematic as not only does it broadcast a message that transgressions are 
expected, but it also misunderstands the type of footage typically captured from body-worn 
cameras. There is a long established body of research illustrating an implicit ‘camera view 
bias’ whereby viewers are inclined to interpret footage from the perspective of the camera, or 
the person wearing the camera; ‘When video allows us to look through someone’s eyes, we 
tend to adopt an interpretation that favors that person’ (Stoughton cited in Williams et al. 
2016). Lassiter et al. (2005: 28) have highlighted the ‘robust and pervasive’ biasing effect of 
camera perspective in studies of videotaped confessions. They point to the ‘reality’ gleaned 
from multiple studies that if a camera is focused solely on a suspect confessing during an 
interrogation it ‘influences not only judgements of voluntariness but also perceived likelihood 
of guilt and sentencing recommendations; perceived likelihood of guilt is greater and 
                                                 
2 A meta-analysis of multi-site, multi-national randomized controlled trials of police BWC, including a total 
population of over 2 million officers, and 2.2 million police officer-hours, found that officers were 15% more 
likely to experience an assault when wearing the cameras. The results suggest that the cameras could potentially 
aggravate interpersonal conflict. This has largely been attributed to officer discretion on when to activate the 
camera, similar to what has been proposed in schools (Ariel et al, 2016; Taylor, 2016). 
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sentencing recommendations are more severe’. The positioning of the camera and its field of 
vision has been found to impact on the interpretation of events. In relation to BWC, this has 
been demonstrated through simulations of police-public encounters that highlight the degree 
to which footage is subjectively interpreted, and usually to the detriment of the person/s being 
filmed (Williams et al. 2016). In the simulations the body movements of the officer rendered 
footage jerky and irregular which made it look as though the person being filmed was 
becoming animated and aggressive. However, when viewed from another angle, it is clear 
that there is no aggression and the participant is, in fact, dancing. The fact that it is the police 
officer wearing the camera means that the viewer is most likely to be empathetic to their 
perspective, and so this is likely to be the case in schools too, irrespective of whether it is 
SROs, teachers or school principals. The issue with erratic and jumpy footage as a result of 
natural body movements has already been raised in court cases using BWC evidence. For 
example, as part of an evaluation of Arizona Police Department’s implementation of BWC, 
one officer reported that lawyers had claimed that the officer's natural body movements had 
made a suspect appear to be swaying more than they actually were. While the officer refuted 
this by saying that the video footage is clear when someone is intoxicated, he acknowledged 
that such situations could prevent the use of video footage in future investigations (Roy, 
2014). In relation to schools, the use of BWC by teachers or police introduces an inherent 
power imbalance that could translate into the (mis)interpretation of footage. Visual school 
surveillance has been ‘actively sought out as a neutral observer to verify events and elicit the 
truth’ (Taylor, 2012: 227) but research has shown that, far from objective, BWC footage is 
embedded with partiality and bias. A broader concern relating to the justification of the need 
to continuously compile evidence, is that students are turned into potential suspects – they are 
assailants in waiting – and this can have a very negative impact on classroom dynamics and 
student-teacher interactions.   
 
Regulation of school BWC in the UK and US 
 
It might be presumed that the sensitive nature of recording the everyday actions of 
schoolchildren would summon strict regulatory frameworks and protocols, but in fact these 
these appear to be relatively tolerant of school-based surveillance in many countries. In the 
UK for example, the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), the independent authority 
responsible for the ‘data privacy’ of individuals, have confirmed that the use of body-worn 
cameras for teachers is compliant with the Data Protection Act’s 1998 principles (which have 
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previously been problematized several years ago for their inability to adequately regulate the 
use of school CCTV cameras (Taylor, 2010a) and digital fingerprinting (Taylor, 2010b)). The 
main issue with the DPA 1998 is that for it to be operable in the vast array of scenarios it 
covers, the principles become somewhat hollow. For example, principle 3 of the Data 
Protection Act 1998 states that ‘Personal data shall be adequate, relevant and not excessive in 
relation to the purpose or purposes for which they are processed.’ However, there is much 
room for subjective interpretation relating to what is considered to be ‘excessive’. For the 
proponents of video surveillance, recording everyday interactions is not considered 
excessive, but rather it is required in order to capture those unpredictable events. This might 
be particularly the case for police officers who have normalised the wearing of a camera as 
part of their uniform alongside their radio, handcuffs, and even weaponry. However, this 
overlooks the unique settings and characteristics of schools. It could be argued that the use of 
body-worn cameras is excessive when the majority of interactions and behaviours captured 
will be of children and not involve any criminal activity. Another principle of the DPA 1998 
outlines; ‘Personal data shall be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date’. This again is 
interesting in relation to police BWC, particularly in the light of camera view bias outlined 
above. Can the partiality of the images be considered accurate? In England and Wales there 
are various other articles and statutes that ostensibly govern the use of surveillance practices. 
The Protection of Freedom Act 2012 (PoFA) introduced a range of measures relating to 
surveillance (and notably in relation to schools by outlawing the fingerprinting of students 
without parental consent), including a surveillance camera code of practice. The PoFA also 
creates the statutory appointment of a Surveillance Camera Commissioner under section 
34(1) and a Surveillance Camera Code of Practice (SCCP), published as guidance under 
section 32(1) of PoFA. The code has been built upon 12 guiding principles, which provide a 
framework of good practice that includes existing legal obligations (including the processing 
of personal data under the Data Protection Act 1998 and a public authority’s current duty to 
adhere to the Human Rights Act 1998). The first principle is that a surveillance cameras 
system must be in ‘in pursuit of a legitimate aim and necessary to meet an identified pressing 
need’. As with the DPA 1998 principles, there is clearly some ambiguity regarding what 
some would consider to be a legitimate aim and a pressing need when it comes to school 
personnel wearing BWC.  
 
In the US, the regulation of surveillance cameras is somewhat different. Constitutional 
interpretation has evolved in the courts, materializing in a number of laws and executive 
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orders dealing specifically with the concept of data protection. However, two developments 
of significance, the Privacy Act 1974 and the Computer Matching and Privacy Act are only 
applicable to personal information held by the federal government and do not have any 
authority over the collection and use of personal information held by other private and public 
sector entities, including schools (for further discussion of the socio-legal aspects of US 
privacy statute see Rosen and Santesso, this collection). In relation to CCTV cameras, the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has argued that schools using CCTV are 
‘unconstitutionally intruding on the legitimate expectation of privacy of students, faculty, 
staff, and visitors’, and are in effect ‘engaging in unreasonable search without a warrant and 
without probable cause or reasonable suspicion’ (cited in Warnick, 2010: 320). However. 
irrespective of this declaration, it is unlikely that school BWC will be ruled as 
unconstitutional in the US courts. More specifically relating to BWC in schools, the 
American Civil Liberties (ACL) (Stanley, 2017: n.p.) outlined the following position:  
 
[B]ody cameras present a real threat to students' privacy and contribute to the creation 
of an environment in schools of pervasive surveillance, with all the bad lessons that 
creates for the future freedom-minded citizens that we want to mold.  
 
Compounding the issue of regulation in the US is that, historically, under the Fourth 
Amendment, young people are denied liberty rights because these rights presuppose the 
capacity to make informed choices, whereas it is presumed that the limited cognitive and 
emotional capacities of young children do not provide for this – they are seen as as ‘subjects 
in the making’ (Best, 2007: 12). Furthermore, there has been a huge push for all frontline 
officers to be issued with body-worn cameras in the US, and since it is SROs in the US that 
are predominantly wearing the cameras this is likely to go unchallenged.3 The temptation for 
police officers to use footage gained from body cameras to ‘investigate’ wrongdoings is 
clear, as happened with the introduction of CCTV. The main issue is that once captured, 
issues that would have once been resolved through internal disciplinary procedures can 
                                                 
3 Following several high profile fatal shootings of unarmed African Americans by police in the US, demands 
were made for all frontline police officers to wear body cameras as a matter of course. In response, in 2015 
President Barack Obama pledged funding to introduce BWCs in all US states. 
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become a criminal matter, inviting formal legal action. There is little discretion4 if the 
cameras are used in concert with zero tolerance policies towards school behaviour. Forging a 
conduit between the school and criminal justice is examined in greater detail below. 
 
Impacts and effects  
 
It is difficult to pinpoint the precise impacts and effects of school-based surveillance. Its 
introduction is often part of a shift in the climate of the school, or society more broadly. As 
schools have become a repository for multiple wide ranging societal issues (from terrorism to 
drug use, obesity to bullying), they have increasingly become responsibilised to address them 
(Taylor, forthcoming). Finding themselves ill-equipped to respond unaided to the numerous 
requirements and demands, the private sector has increasingly been on hand to provide a 
range of sophisticated and high-tech ‘solutions’ often with surveillance attributes. For 
example, a growing anxiety that schoolchildren were becoming radicalised or exposed to 
extremist ideologies resulted in schools being tasked, legally in some countries5, to prevent 
schoolchildren from being drawn into terrorism. As a result ‘anti-radicalisation’ software was 
introduced to monitor students’ online activities. The impact of this specific scrutiny on 
individual children might be difficult to isolate and empirically measure. However, the more 
generalised outcome of conjuring up a climate of suspicion, fear and mistrust is not difficult 
to imagine. Similarly for school BWC. The harm arising from the intensification of neoteric 
technological surveillance in the school may be relatively imperceptible or inconsequential to 
(most) individuals, but cumulative and substantial in its impact on particular groups or 
society over time. It might, for example, contribute to intensifying social divisions, engender 
inequalities and worsen student outcomes, by increasing the number of exclusions from 
mainstream education, for example. The increasing blurring of boundaries between the 
                                                 
4 Several studies have highlighted racial disparities in the application of “mandatory” punishments (Curran, 
2016; Giroux, 2003; Hoffman, 2012; Johnston, 2000; Skiba et al., 2000) suggesting that discretion is still used 
in schools with zero tolerance policies, but that this is dependent upon the demographics of the student involved, 
particularly ethnicity. For example, drawing upon national data collected by the U.S. Department of Education, 
Curran (2016) found the increase in suspension rates for black students as a result of zero tolerance was 
approximately three times the size of that for white students. Similarly, Skiba et al. (2000) reported that African 
Americans received harsher punishments than their peers, often for subjectively defined offenses. Of note, is 
that research has shown that students are aware of this disparity. For example, Kupchik and Ellis (2008: 549) 
found that ‘African American students perceive less fairness and consistency of school rules and their 
enforcement than do White students.’ 
5 In the United Kingdom, under section 26 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, ‘The Prevent duty’5 
was introduced which mandates that specified authorities (including schools) must, ‘in the exercise of their 
functions, have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’. 
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criminal justice system and school disciplinary policies and practices ultimately deprives 
students of their human rights in relation to their right to education, the right to 
proportionality in punishment, and the right to freedom of expression.  
 
Social sorting and the criminalisation of schoolchildren 
 
School surveillance often papers over complex underlying social divisions and issues with 
crude techno-fixes that attempt to command conformity and compliance. However, such 
responses can result in unintended consequences, often alienating some children and creating 
an atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust in the classroom. When technologies typically 
associated with law enforcement are introduced into schools it is little wonder that research 
has found that some schoolchildren feel criminalised (McCahill and Finn, 2010; Rios, 2011; 
Taylor, 2010a; 2011). It is easy to imagine how attending school on a campus equipped with 
metal detectors and surveillance cameras, that is patrolled by police officers (even if they are 
renamed ‘school resource officers’), and subscribes to school policies that involve 
randomised drug and alcohol screening with zero tolerance approaches to discipline, might 
result in schoolchildren wondering how they are perceived by society if such castigatory 
systems are deemed necessary. Howard Becker’s labelling theory is well versed in the 
sociological understanding of deviance, and more recent research has found that the 
criminalisation process, augmented by school surveillance technologies, can result in a self-
fulfilling prophecy, whereby students come to act in accordance with the way in which they 
believe they have been labelled or prejudged (Rios, 2011; Taylor, 2013).  
 
The use of BWC in schools also places a certain preemptive responsibility on teachers and 
school staff to activate the cameras when they perceive something worthy of capture is going 
to materialise. This could summons ‘the classifying drive of contemporary surveillance’ 
known as ‘social sorting’ (Lyon, 2003: 13), whereby schoolchildren are placed into 
categories of risk based on abstracted and incomplete data. Their profile is then used as a 
proxy measure for likely views, values and intentions. Given the disparities in discipline and 
punishment along lines of ethnicity, surveillance can be seen to perpetuate inequalities. The 
activation of cameras could prompt a negative reaction since the subtext of their use is that 
the school personnel believes the student to be in some way problematic or dangerous. 
Cameras have been perceived as a ‘symbol of mistrust’ (Author/s, date) and so mobilizing 
power by activating the camera could potentially be considered to be an incendiary act. 
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School-to-prison pipeline  
 
The more ephemeral impacts of school surveillance outlined above – an ambient climate of 
suspicion, and feeling criminalised – can have some very real and tangible structural 
consequences. The use of school surveillance technologies in concert with onsite criminal 
justice personnel and disciplinary regimes can set in motion serious, yet unintended, 
consequences such as the emergence of what Devine (1996) has termed the ‘school to prison 
pipeline’ (STPP) (see also Devlin and Gottfredson; King, Rusoja, and Peguero, this 
collection), a metaphoric conduit that has emerged between US schools and the criminal 
justice system. Scholars have argued that a range of policies and practices in the US 
education system increasingly filter students from the classroom to the prison. In other words, 
it is a process of criminalizing youth that is carried out by disciplinary policies and practices 
within schools, in which surveillance technologies such as CCTV and BWC are of course 
implicated, that put students into contact with law enforcement.  
 
While the STPP is facilitated by multiple trends in contemporary education, it is most directly 
attributable to a trio of interrelated developments: the use of surveillance technologies 
associated with law enforcement; the delegation of school discipline to onsite criminal justice 
personnel such as SROs, and the expansion of zero tolerance policies which ultimately 
criminalises relatively minor, unintentional, or subjectively defined infractions. For example, 
the police handling of disciplinary issues escalates minor, non-violent infractions into violent, 
criminal incidents that have negative impacts on students. By way of example, The Gun-Free 
Schools Act 1994, mandated a 12 month suspension for any student caught bringing a 
weapon to school. However, the definition of ‘weapon’ was very loosely defined, yet broadly 
interpreted, resulting in some students being suspended for relatively minor acts. For 
example, a six year old was suspended for taking a camping utensil into school (Urbina, 
2009). As patterns of discipline in schools begin to mirror law enforcement models, increased 
suspensions, expulsions, and elevated drop-out rates, have materialised, particularly amongst 
those from non-White backgrounds. Commenting on the STPP in the US, Kim, Losen and 
Hewitt (2010: 2) note that ‘thirty years ago, Black students were approximately twice as 
likely to be suspended as their white counterparts; today, they are more than three times as 




Conclusion: Intensifying and normalising surveillance in schools 
 
 
Addressing the seeming necessity to monitor schoolchildren in ever finer granularity, this 
chapter has explored the relatively recent use of body-worn surveillance cameras in schools, 
whilst recognising that there are many other technologies and practices currently being used. 
The majority of the examples stem from the USA and the UK, but it is important to recognise 
that other countries also have their own culturally-mediated examples of school-based 
surveillance practices. Ellis (cited in Bloom, 2017: n.p.) asserts: 
 
When you introduce new technology, if people haven’t had experience of it already, 
people tend to regard it as negative, initially. But as they get used to it, people get less 
negative.  
 
This may well be the case, but this sentiment ignores the power dynamics clearly evident 
when school teachers, principals and SROs are sanctioned to wear body-cameras for the 
general collection of visual data. Certainly, surveillance has an ability to appear ordinary and 
quickly fade into the background, quietly habituating new ways of thinking and being. But 
such habituation should be problematized, and the tacit compliance with regimes of 
surveillance should not be seen as a sign of endorsement by those that are subject to it. In 
following Walter Benjamin’s (1996) observation that exceptions readily become the rule, the 
danger here is that the provisional and exceptional techniques that originate within the school 
become functionally indispensable in the surveillance age, and translated into modes of 
governance. Integrating neoteric surveillance technologies in concert with education 
habituates young people to accept increased monitoring and scrutiny whilst simultaneously 
concealing any pernicious effects. Exacerbating the issue, the impacts are structural and 
longitudinal which renders them relatively opaque.   
 
There remains a need for further research on this topic, particularly empirical and in-depth 
analysis of the impacts, effects and affects on schoolchildren and teachers. Although it has 
been recognised that schoolchildren are the subjects of a disproportionate amount of 
surveillance, the materiality of their existence in the surveillance age and the transformations 
it engenders in schools have been marginalised comparative to the experiences of adults. A 
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handful of studies have examined the impact of surveillance technology in schools, 
particularly in relation to the use of surveillance cameras (McCahill and Finn, 2010; Taylor, 
2010a; 2011) but the research is becoming perceptibly dated and, importantly, precedes some 
major developments in school surveillance technologies. Surveillance has an extraordinary 
ability to become the new normal. Thrift claims that ‘much of the background of life is 
“second nature”, the artificial equivalent of breathing’ (Thrift, 2004: 584) and as surveillance 
technologies come to be regarded as ‘mundane as the blackboard at the front of the 
classroom’ (Taylor, 2013). They quietly rescript thoughts and behaviours, creating new 
school cultures. It is important to explore how students and teachers experience school-based 
surveillance, and what its impact on pedagogy and learning is. While the use of BWC might 
appeal as a novel techno-fix to school indiscipline, the projected outcomes of the subtle 
processes that it sets in motion; the criminalisation of minor infractions, the cultivation of 
mistrust and suspicion, and the impact on the privacy of students and staff, are too great to 
risk. Yet despite the evidence that alternative practices are likely to offer more positive 
outcomes in relation to school behaviour (see Kupchik and Deakin, this collection), the 
propagatory nature of surveillance means that in all likelihood, BWC will become 
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